I’m not sure that’s the best way of representing the central tenets of Rand’s view. Yes, individual happiness and individual rights are important to her; but like all moral philosophers, she has a particular view of what constitutes these things. We tend to talk about happiness and rights as if there is some clear consensus on exactly what these things involve. This is not the case, however, and so we must specify.
Rand does not take happiness to be merely an emotion or a state of mind—e.g., a subjective feeling of joy or contentment—but rather a state of being. A happy life is a successful life, but this raises the question of what counts as success. Rand’s view puts quite a bit of emphasis on freedom, independence, and self-reliance. Moreover, she sees these as very tightly related to each other.
Rand believes that we have only two options: egoism or altruism. The former entails concern for own interests without regard for the interests of others (except insofar as promoting their interests promotes our own), while the latter entails concern for the interests of others without regard for our own interests (except insofar as promoting our own interests promotes the interests of others).*
Given these choices, Rand opts for egoism. The life she identifies as altruistic is contrary to happiness. One cannot live a successful life, or any life at all that recognizes our value as human beings, if our sole pursuit is the good of others. We’d be better off dead than living that way, and so we must reject such a life as being fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of living and the nobility of a human being. It cannot possibly be the correct way to live.**
This might help us to see, then, why Rand takes the particular stand she does with regard to collectivism. We again are told there are two options: laissez-faire capitalism and collectivism. Collectivism requires us to be concerned with the interests of others even when promoting their interests does not promote our own. Yet if our only choices are egoism or altruism, then collectivism must be a form of altruism. Thus if altruism is to be rejected, so too must collectivism be rejected (and laissez-faire capitalism is to be accepted).
We can also look at collectivism from the perspective of individual rights. The members of a collective take on certain duties to one another, and thus each member can demand certain things from one another. To the extent that we are beholden to others, however, we are not free. Moreover, collectivism leads us to be mutually interdependent, which further reduces our freedom (if I cannot live without you, I am not truly free of you). Here, then, we see how freedom, independence, and self-reliance converge.***
If one were to conceptualize individual happiness and individual rights differently than Rand—and there is a long and complicated debate over the proper way to conceptualize these things—then one might think that collectivism is (or could be made) consistent with them. Quite a lot depends on how demanding we are going to be of these concepts. Freedom might be more complicated than simply a lack of duties. Independence might not require such radical self-reliance. In any case, the conversation is far from over.
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* This can all be found in the introduction to her book The Virtue of Selfishness. One of the most common criticisms of Rand is that she is operating on a false dilemma right from the start. As the purpose of this post is to explain Rand rather than critique her, however, I will leave that to the side for now. Know, however, that you are not alone if you think these options do not seem to exhaust the possibilities.
** Note that while Randians often take themselves to be saying something innovative or explosive in presenting this argument, virtually no one actually disagrees that we must reject this version of altruism. As W.D. Hudson observed: “Is it not significant that those who advocate self-sacrifice usually present it as a path to self-realization? [...] If a man used moral language to commend not doing whatever would give rise to the flourishing of man as what he took man to be, then we should consider him irrational.”
*** Again, this all depends on specific definitions of these notions. All rights, even the individual rights promoted by Rand, confer duties of non-interference on others. Why do these duties not diminish our freedom in morally objectionable ways? What about when the candidates I vote for do not win their elections? There is also the question of how objectionable a loss of freedom is if it is one we willingly take on, such as when we form a social contract for mutual protection and benefit.