There is certainly an apparent contradiction, which is to say that the statements at least appear to be in tension with one another. There is not, however, an actual contradiction. An actual contradiction requires internal inconsistency of some type. One must either assert both A and not-A, or commit oneself to a course of reason that could lead to both A and not-A. The statements in question cannot be logically represented as negations of one another (and, indeed, are about quite different things), so asserting the two statements does not amount to asserting both A and not-A. Furthermore, we are given the statements in isolation. We are not given any course of reasoning for either. Thus there is no course of reasoning in the statements themselves that can be said to lead to both A and not-A. And as fallacies are also errors in a course of reasoning, the statements themselves cannot present any fallacies.
Therefore, we have to ask if there is any possible course of reasoning that could lead to both statements without committing to a contradiction or committing any fallacies. There are plenty of ways to fail this test, of course, and I imagine that many people who would assert both statements would end up contradicting themselves. But we do not test for consistency by looking for ways that the course of reasoning could go badly. We test for consistency by attempting to find at least one possible way of avoiding contradiction. Is there such a way? It seems to me that there are several.
One might hold that the freedom of religion is more fundamental than the right to bear arms for some reason or another. Perhaps freedom of religion is both a moral right and a political right, whereas the right to bear arms is merely a political right. Alternatively, one might hold that rights are not absolute (that is, there are exceptions to all of them), and that the conditions for limiting the right to bear arms have been met, whereas the conditions for limiting the freedom of religion have not been met. Perhaps Islam is simply a flimsy justification for crimes that would have occurred anyway, whereas guns are a necessary part of the explanation for the commission or severity of certain crimes.
In the latter case, limiting the freedom of religion would have no effect (the crimes would have been justified some other way), whereas limiting the right to bear arms might improve the situation—it reduces the opportunity for criminal action, leading to fewer who choose to go on a killing spree; those who choose to go on a killing spree anyway might have to choose a less deadly weapon, leading to less severe outcomes; and those who pursue illegal weapons have a higher chance of getting caught before they can carry out their crime.
We might find fault with either of these courses of reasoning, but that they may be mistaken does not entail that they are inconsistent. That is to say, factual shortcomings are importantly different from logical shortcomings. We should also ask whether or not the statements in question are both accurate and charitable representations of the existing arguments and their conclusions. Many would hold, for instance, that limiting access to certain sorts of weapons does not infringe on the right to bear arms so long as weapons for self-defense are still available. Thus why we do not object to being denied access to nuclear bombs. This, they might say, is consistent with allowing people to have their religion, but nevertheless banning certain practices (it is legal in the US to sacrifice goats, for instance, but not children).
Sorry you haven’t received many actual answers. Apparently, some didn’t notice that you did not present any argument, but rather asked a question about a pair of statements.