How much are we actually disagreeing? It seems like this argument comes down to the idea that a woman might decide to abort for careless, frivolous reasons a child they had otherwise decided to carry full-term—and therefore there ought to be legislation in place to prevent that. But if we actually do surveys and see what reasons women have for making the decision to abort, especially late-term, that’s not what’s actually happening. They’re making those decisions for real, serious, often tragic reasons.(And/or, as has been mentioned, there were barriers put in place that prevented them from seeking an earlier abortion). Why involve law to address a concept that doesn’t match reality, especially when that law’s probably going to affect women that don’t match the conceptual concern? Unless I’m missing something.
I do disagree on the train track scenario. There are too many variables for someone to have a legal obligation to jump down. Just for example, what if that person has a physical impediment—not one that would make the jump-and-rescue impossible, but would make it significantly less likely for them to be successful than for most others. Do they have a legal obligation to make the jump even if it’s more risky for them? Or say that person has a child, or an otherwise dependent relative—is it really a legal obligation of theirs to risk not only their life, but the wellbeing of the person who depends on them? And how do we measure what “enough time” would be for a given person to react with a reasonable expectation of their success? Or is chance of success not a factor at all, and they’ll be legally on the hook if they weren’t willing to die? It’s certainly wonderful for a person to jump down—and in fact, in one of the situations, the man who jumped down had a family who was with him in the station, watching him, freaking out because they were sure they had just watched him die… Certainly wonderful, altruistic behavior; that man was a hero; but it doesn’t seem like something that can be legally required.
Plus, it seems difficult to say that, in the case where there’s only one other person, that person’s legally obligated to act—but if there’s more than one, then the responsibility is dispersed and no one’s legally responsible? But what if there were two people still standing on the platform, and it was a situation where they could have worked together to lift the fallen person up—would it then be a legal obligation again?
Of course, I hope we live in a society where, culturally, more often than not, someone—or, rather, many people—will try to help. But that’s different from legal obligation to do so.
(Also, to go back to an earlier point, I’m still not convinced the conjoined twins scenario is an analogous situation, regardless of how we answer the question about the surgery… But if we’re going to be trying to find the limit of bodily autonomy: in cases of conjoined twins who share a vital organ, we have two people who developed from the same embryo and didn’t fully separate. The shared organ is literally a shared organ. Neither can clearly claim it as part of their own body, because it’s the part of their body that literally isn’t theirs alone.)