Having read the decision, I agree with the conclusion but not the reasoning (or at least, not the entirety of the reasoning). I also find it interesting that the decision’s reasoning abandons textualism (the method of interpretation espoused by five of the six justices in the majority) in favor of purposivism (a method those same five typically despise, particularly Alito and Gorsuch). It’s a bit of a win for Justice Jackson, however, whose concurrence presents an alternative reasoning for the majority’s holding that underlines the Court’s embrace of purposivism and—unlike the reasoning of the other five—does not contradict her previous jurisprudence. Barrett’s steadfastly textualist dissent makes a similar point, by the way.
Here is the section of the law at issue:
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The reasoning of the majority argues that clause (2) inherits wording from clause (1) despite the fact that the semicolon followed by “or” at the end of (1) followed by a new numbered clause is a textbook way of isolating clauses so that they do not inherit wording from one another. And not only is it textbook, it is textualist—by which I mean it is explicitly the formulation that textualists recommend for separating clauses. So on any standard textualist reading, clause (1) is explicitly about documents, while clause (2) is a catch-all clause. To avoid this outcome, the court’s textualists decided to embrace purposivism instead. A purposivist approach has no trouble integrating the legislative context of the law, which clearly shows that the intent of the law was to criminalize tampering with documents in any way that impedes an official proceeding. But it clearly contradicts previous declarations from this court that purposivism has no place in the law—an assertion that forms the basis of several cases the Court has decided over the past few terms.
It’s odd that the majority’s conservatives tied themselves up in this way. For one thing, once we accept the legitimacy of purposivism, there is no need to argue that clause (2) inherits language from clause (1). The legislative context is sufficient on its own to justify the Court’s reading of clause (2). Second, if you really think that clause (2) can only be read narrowly if it inherits some other language from earlier in the statute, then you need look no further than the opening phrase in (c)—“whoever corruptly.” The word “corruptly” is defined in section 1515(b):
As used in section 1505, the term “corruptly” means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.
Alternatively, one could use a dictionary definition of “corruptly,” which leaves us with “dishonestly using one’s position or power to obtain an advantage.” So whether we use the definition from the text of the law or the definition from the text of a dictionary (both of which are standard textualist moves depending on the situation), we are left with a definition that excludes defendants like Fischer.
@seawulf575 “The SCOTUS just ruled that the statute used by the J6 committee [...] does not apply to the protesters as the law was created to preserve evidence in support of investigations. Since none of the protesters did anything with evidence, it didn’t apply.”
Leaving aside @zenvelo‘s point regarding the J6 committee vs. the DOJ, this is not quite right. Roberts refused the defendant’s request to define the statute as applying only to evidentiary procedures. Instead, the holding is that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) requires that the defendant interfered—or attempted to interfere—with records, documents, objects, or anything else that was to be used in an official proceeding (where the term “official proceeding” is broadly construed). This matters for two main reasons: first, it allows prosecutors to reinstate the charges if they can connect the defendant’s behavior to any sort of document tampering; and second, it leaves the charges against Trump in place since he is accused of tampering with documents (but not of interfering with an evidentiary procedure).
“On a side note, irony lifted its ugly head. When the J6 committee had to turn over control of the committee to the Repubs in the house, they deleted a whole lot of evidence they had collected.”
The people making this claim are basing it on a letter written by Congressman Barry Loudermilk, but the letter says no such thing. And Loudermilk himself said: “Whether the missing information has been destroyed, was sent to other entities or is still in the possession of members of Congress from the select committee is uncertain at this time.” Furthermore, all of the evidence itself has been turned over. At issue are the original recordings, which Bennie Thompson notes are not required under current House rules—rules the Republicans could change but have chosen to leave in place (which implies that they don’t really think there’s a problem here, they just want to complain for political advantage).
Composing members:
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